Utah v. Friis : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
Utah v. Friis : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Jan Graham, Scott M. Burns; attorneys for appellee.
D. Bruce Oliver; D. Bruce Oliver, P.C.; attorney for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Robert Friis, No. 960445 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/347
B«*€F 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
50 
.Av 
D " " 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRIIS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 960445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Final Judgment and Jury Verdict 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, County of Iron 
State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves 
D. Bruce Oliver (5120) 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. #3340 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
City, Utah 84114 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
) 
KB - 4 1998 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ROBERT FRIIS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 960445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Final Judgment and Jury Verdict 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court, County of Iron 
State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves 
D. Bruce Oliver (5120) 
D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. #3340 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
City, Utah 84114 
Scott M. Burns 
Iron County Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Pages 
Table of Authorities iii 
Argument 1-7 
Point I-IV. Failure to Prove an Element of the Crime 
is Plain Error 1-4 
Point VI. Failure of the Court to Determine 
Appropriateness of Mistrial Caused 
Double Jeopardy 5-7 
Conclusion 7 
Certificate of Mailing 8 
Addenda 9 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGES 
United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1986) 2 
State v. Castle, P.2d , 333 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Ct. App. January 2, 1998) 5 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1953, as amended) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1953, as amended) 7 
RULES 
Utah R. Evid. 605 4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
ill 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1218 
Telephone: (801) 32 8-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs • 
ROBERT FRIIS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Comes now the appellant, Robert Friis, by and through 
counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, and, pursuant to the Rule 24 (c), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby replies to the appelleeTs 
new matters set forth as follows: 
POINTS I-IV. 
FAILURE TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME IS PLAIN ERROR. 
Counsel for Appellee attempts to discredit appellant's 
position that it was error for the judge in this matter to assist 
the State in the presentation of it's case. The appellee, in 
Case No. 960445-CA 
Priority No. 2 
it's Brief, states that the judge's remarks were not testimony 
because they were unsworn. This begs the point that the State 
had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every 
element of the offense. (See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1953, as 
amended); addendum A.) The trial judge herein relieved the state 
of proving the element of the offense as it pertained to the 
competency of the California Court. The only person who provided 
information on the structure and jurisdiction of the California 
Court system was the trial judge. He had practiced in 
California, he knew, or so he told counsel, how the California 
Court's were structured. (R. at 894) (Addendum B). When the 
trial judge took judicial notice of the judicial system in the 
State of California he lost his neutrality and became an advocate 
for the State's case. In United States v. Joseph, 781 F.2d 549 
(6th Cir. 1986) the court ruled that it was reversible error for 
a judge in a bench trial to rely upon previously excluded 
evidence to convict the defendant. This case has two 
applications to this case. 
The trial judge herein had previously stated that the 
burden to prove jurisdiction was upon the State. Judge Eves 
stated: 
It leaves open for adjudication during these proceedings the 
question of whether a court of competent jurisdiction 
somewhere has issued a decree or Order which the defendant 
has violated in this State. And that's the only thing the 
State's required to prove as far as I can see from the 
statute. 
2 
(R. at 784; addendum B). 
Judge Eves further stated that he was going to let the 
jury decide the question as to the competency of the court 
issuing the order or decree. (See R. at 797, generally; addendum 
C). He specifically stated that "But I don't think I can [make 
the determination that the California Court is a court of 
competent jurisdiction] since itTs an element of the offense." 
(R. at 797). 
Judge Eves went on further to advise Mr. Burns, the 
prosecuting attorney, that the method of proving the competency 
jurisdiction of the court issuing the order which was the subject 
matter of this case was: 
[T]o file a pretrial motion in limine and ask the court to 
adjudicate whether the California Superior Court is a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 
(R. at 797; addendum C). 
Then contrary to his prior determination, Judge Eves went on to 
state: 
As a matter of fact, Ifm well aware of the California system 
having been licensed in the state of California to practice 
law, having practiced there for five years before I moved 
to, to Utah in the, both the municipal courts and the 
superior courts of that state. And I am well aware of the 
fact that the California Superior Court is analogous to the 
Utah District Court and that the court is the court that is 
charged with handling domestic matters, divorce matters. 
(R. at 893-94; addendum D). 
It was this intimate knowledge of California courts which then 
enabled him to take judicial notice of the competency of the 
3 
court which issued the order in this case, in violation of the 
rules of evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 605 precludes such judicial 
notice, providing: 
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that 
trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to 
preserve the point. 
Utah R. Evid. 605. Judge Eves testimony and personal knowledge 
was extremely critical to the presentation of the prosecutions 
case and is plain error reviewable by this court. His testimony 
relieved the state of the burden of proving one of the elements 
of the offense. The judge himself previously said he could not 
do so. 
Absent the judge's assistance in proving this element 
of the offense there would have been no conviction. This court 
should overturn Mr. Friis' conviction. Like the case in Joseph, 
supra., the judge indicated that he could not assist the 
prosecution in this case. The judge went on to state that he 
didn't think that the admission of the Decree would prove that 
the Decree was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. He 
then proceeds to rescue a floundering prosecution by taking 
judicial notice of an element of the offense alleged based upon 
his own experience in the practice of law in California. 
4 
POINT VI. 
FAILURES OF THE COURT TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATENESS OF MISTRIAL 
CAUSED DOUBLE JEOPARDY. 
In State v. Castle, P. 2d , 333 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26 (January 2, 1998), the Utah Court of Appeals clarifies as 
to when a defendant is entitled to have jeopardy attach for 
purposes of double jeopardy when the state moves for a mistrial 
during trial. In Castle, this court stated: 
When ordering a mistrial, the trial court must support it's 
ruling by showing that legal necessity required the mistrial 
in the interests of justice. See Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 358. 
"The doctrine of legal necessity means that absent the 
consent of the defendant to a mistrial, the court must 
refrain from prematurely discharging the jury unless it 
determines, after careful inquiry that discharging the jury 
is the only reasonable alternative to insure justice under 
the circumstances." State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 584 (Ut. 
Ct. App 1991) citing Ambrose, 598 P. 2d at 358) . 
Id. at 28. 
In this case there was no inquiry as to possible bias. 
The defense did not do anything to provoke the conduct of the 
juror, as a matter of fact defense counsel did all that he could 
to avoid the contact. Further, defense counsel reported the 
contact with the juror immediately to both the prosecution and 
the court. There was no legal necessity created or present which 
would have prevented the continuation of the trial with the jury 
as it was then constituted. Defendant had that right. Defendant 
was deprived of that right by the ruling of the judge on the 
motion from the State. It was not impossible to proceed with the 
5 
trial. The State's Motion for mistrial was not joined by 
defendant, he resisted such a motion. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1953, as amended) provides 
the guidelines and the law as it applies to this issue m this 
case. This statute provides: 
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution 
for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a 
subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense 
arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(I) resulted in acquittal; or 
(n) resulted in conviction; or 
(in) was improperly terminated; or 
(IV) was terminated by a final order or judgment for 
the defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated and that necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure 
conviction m the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in 
a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or m a 
determination that there was insufficient evidence to 
warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included 
offense is an acquittal of the greater offense even though 
the conviction for the lesser included offense is 
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted m 
a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, 
or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, 
set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a 
judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if 
the termination takes place before the verdict, is for 
reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after 
a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, 
or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first witness is 
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sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper 
if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judgment 
entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed 
with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the 
state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 (1997). 
The appropriate sub-section which is controlling herein 
is 76-1-403 (4) (c) (iii) . This sub-section provides that in order 
to terminate a prosecution it must be impossible to proceed with 
the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state. There 
was no inquiry about any prejudice or bias and there was no 
effort to determine whether or not it was impossible to continue 
without injustice to either the defendant, or the state. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the issues raised in his 
initial brief, the appellant hereby requests this Honorable Court 
to reverse the conviction. 
7 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of 
February, 1998. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 4th 
day of February, 1998, I served a copy of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the Appellee in this 
matter, by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: J. Frederick Voros, 
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Jan Graham, Utah Attorney 
General, Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 1998. 
ADDENDUM A 
CRIMINAL CODE 76-1-601 
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to 
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defen-
dant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 1974 
I*. 1-404. C o n c u r r e n t jurisdiction — Prosecution in 
*^ o the r jurisdiction barring prosecution in 
s ta te . 
if a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one 
more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this 
te and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecu-
,n in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
n in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
Acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those 
•terms are denned in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
r'osecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequen t p rosecu t ion no t b a r r e d — Cir-
cums tances . 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen-
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney 
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to 
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of 
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack. 
1973 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF P R O O F 
76-1-501. P r e s u m p t i o n of i nnocence — "Element of t he 
offense" denned . 
11) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
f3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
°i the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1973 
'6-1-502. Nega t ing defense by a l lega t ion o r proof — 
When no t r e q u i r e d . 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or 
other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of 
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution 
or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative 
defense. 1973 
76
"l-503. P r e s u m p t i o n of fact. 
f^- evidentiary presumption established by this code or 
l
*ter penal statute has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presump-
tion exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact 
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed 
fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a pre-
sumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while 
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to 
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense p r e s e n t e d by de fendan t . 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or 
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant. 1973 
PART 6 
DEFINITIONS 
76-1-601. Definit ions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this 
title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and in-
cludes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibil-
ity is in issue in a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally 
or in any other manner that he is in control of 
such an item. 
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of 
this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a 
legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private 
corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated 
association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to 
exercise dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, 
not amounting to serious bodily injury, that creates or 
causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigure-
ment, or temporary loss or impairment of the function of 
any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, 
typewriting, printing, electronic storage or transmission, 
or any other method of recording information or fixing 
information in a form capable of being preserved. 1996 
CHAPTER 2 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
P a r t 1 
Culpabi l i ty Genera l ly 
Section 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and crimi-
nal responsibility. 
ADDENDUM B 
1 criminal statute the same thing is required that, 
2 is that they have to establish whether or not that 
3 it's a court of competent jurisdiction and the way 
4 to do that is by filing it, allowing the 
5 challenge - -
6 THE JUDGE: I think I've heard that 
7 argument about five or six times now. And I've, I 
8 understand your position. And you may turn out to 
9 be right. We'll see. But all I can tell you is as 
10 I look at the statutory scheme there is no clear 
11 answer. All I can tell you is the statute, the 
12 criminal statute which is being applied in this 
13 case does not refer to any such requirement. It 
14 leaves open for adjudication during these 
15 proceedings the question of whether a court of 
16 competent jurisdiction somewhere has issued a 
17 decree or Order which the defendant has violated in 
18 this State. And that's the only thing the State's 
19 required to prove so far as I can see from the 
20 statute. 
21 I would rule differently, obviously, if 
22 this were a civil case and there was an, an attempt 
23 being made for the Court, to ask the Court to 
24 enforce civilly an Order because I think Holme vs. 
25 Smilowit z is right on point on that, in that 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 356 
ADDENDUM C 
c o nip etent jurisdiction a t t h e t i m e t hey i s s u -
MR. OLIVER: So-~ 
MR , BURNS : Bn t- i sn ' 1 
T h e C o u r t c r u i ' t t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e of t h e f a c t 
t . 11< i l ( s h o J I i 11 a 111 i ! I * 1 •' > . 
THE JUDGE: D o y o i l •'.'' ~ - " ~ r e a d t* ~ v o i i 
•
 ;
 -'- > •-- •: ' u t i o n m a n u a l ? 
MR, BURNS: Yes, you might have to. 
THE JUDGE: It says that the proper way 
to raise that issue is to f :i ] B a p r e t r :i a ] i i i : t: :i : i i i i i 
1imine and ask the Court to adjudicate whether the 
California S u p *-M j > > I I'UIII t i ( i i o u i t f romp <-' t cj 111 
jurisdiction. 
We 1 ] I ha ven' t done that, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: And therefore, the issue is 
open for evidence. Now, that- means : ;.CI f 
there's evidence one way > r • :;--- ^tr> r then 
g o i n g t <J I J . i v (-  I « • i H I • *- - i - e 
the question unless you want me to make that 
riet p i m i nr-c ' on a r A threshold issue. E.:* ": ^u ^ 
think I i M n since it's a n element o *• t: h e offense. 
Now the j ury ca n dr aw their own 
conclusions a s t o t h e fact t h a t D e i 11 :i i s S C :> 1 e t h e 
Judge of t he Superior Court of California issued 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 36 9 
ADDENDUM D 
K.V L i -.. <.Jt _ i 
6 
7 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
and i divorce decree setting forth six 
• r- > j.- ": si r a L x ^ h w i c h a xx : : ~: e r i m v i s i t: h y Linda 
hree weeks. . :ie , the pleadings name 
::bei\ Ft: jr. and .,.1: _K- Pace who have both been 
i t i i e 
p a i t i e s nave t e s t i f i e d abort: :!'£• p l e a d i n g s . And 
the p l e a d : r:: r # r - ± a '- -~- m p 1 i f h'l'l, i q n r- d 
b^ / the judge over his signature with that Superior 
Court on have been tendered to this ".'1 o r r" . ^o 
to support :. :ie /curt 
t a k i n a ] u d r i a : notice 
I I ! i l M i l . M ' I I I I t ) 
*" b -": t. !! . s g e n e r a l l y k n o w n w i t h i n the 
t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c L i c : : t 1 I •- * f f 1 I i r r . i \ i r 1 . 
But certainly capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy 
i.'cumot reasonab, . be questioned what the court 
s t ruc t u re i s i n ' . - • ; i • - ^ t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a and 
wi i e 11: i e i 1 1 ::II e C a ] , ; , , , ,
 £ • ,. , :i : C c • i 1 1 t I l a s 
jurisdiction over domestic matters. 
As a matter of fact, I'm . - • he 
.:•:•.. : r ornia system, having been licensed : :\^ State 
of California to practice- 1a w, having practiced 
:_
 r ,. L .r for five years before I moved to, to Utah i n 
the , L c r : • • :. e m u n i c i p a. 1 c ourts and the superio r 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR 
PAGE 4 65 
2 II • : :oi irts of that State . And I am well aware of the 
2 "' a : t 11 i a t t h e C a 1 i f o i: i i i a S u perior Co u r t i s 
3 aialogous to the Utah '/ r r ^  ^ - t Coui : r; r ^ * r --,+_ t h a t 
4 < : • 1 i :i t : i s t ,. 1 I E : : i i t: t 1 I i :: a r g e d v; t - ..-;. :.-ng 
1
» : ome s t i c ma11 e r s , di vorce ma11e rs . So as a ;va t: e _ 
t-1 uf fact, i t s I :nowi i ] eas t w 1 Ia t 11 ie 
structure of the California system, is. And I 
think it's capable of easy determination whpflipr 
9 II hhe California Superior Court is the court that 
10 iuild handle •-• domestic matter in that State. 
11 jl i - .:e:ore me that at the 
12 time of the separation the parties to the divorce 
13 || in L d l l L - ' i ., / t fi t ^  I 
14 'I California n: t IU- County i /-in Bernardino. That 
15 I M r . F r i i s filed his d i v o r c e ii i tli.it 'Muni"/ .MM I, and 
16 State. He's the one that chose the 
17 j u r i s d i c t i o n . "T" r i a t as a result of that filing 
1S s is s ue d b y a judge or that c o u r t 
19 I and t h a t ' ? ; ~1* : - s t i p u l a t e d to. 
2 0 I t h i i i k 11 i a t ' s e n :> I i g 1 i t: c • e i i a b ] e i i: i e t: :> t: a k e 
•2 1 I i u r i s d i c t i on o f t he fact t ha t t he Ca 1 I f o rn i a 
22 Superior Court is a court that wouiu -:- -
2 3 , ;.. - i s i i c t ion over a divorce proceeding. And I 
24 think to that extent I'd be willing to take 
2 5 . i i i) t: i c e a i I d s D :i i I s t: i u c t: the jury. 
P EN N Y C . ABBOTT, C S R 
PAGE 4 66 
